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CIVIL LEGAL MALPRACTICE IN
WISCONSIN: HELMBRECHT
AND BEYOND
ROBERT E. COOK*
& PAMELA H. SCHAEFER**
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to examine the underlying
legal framework behind what is increasingly called the "legal
malpractice crisis." Claims arising out of alleged legal malpractice have multiplied enormously within the past thirty
years. Sections I and II of this article will examine the history
of the expanding concept of legal malpractice and the specific
elements of a legal malpractice case. Section III will deal with
the developing law of malpractice as background for the statistical data which verifies the growth of malpractice claims.
These data are presented in Sections IV and V. The statistics
provided by the American Bar Association and Wisconsin Bar
Association make it clear that both the number of claims and
amounts paid out to settle those claims have increased over
the past three to four years. This is a continuation of a longterm trend.
Courtroom tactics have recently begun to be questioned
within the context of malpractice actions. This trend will be
examined in Section VI along with the opposite trend which is
the rule in British courts as set forth in Section VII.
Finally, Section VIII will examine the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's most recent statement on malpractice in Helmbrecht
v. St. PaulInsurance Co. I and some of the foreseeable consequences for Wisconsin practitioners.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
The general concept of attorney malpractice has its origins
in early English case law. English cases from the 18th century
* Senior shareholder of Cook & Franke, S.C.; LL.B., University of Wisconsin
(1950).
** Associate with Cook & Franke, S.C., J.D., University of Wisconsin (1976).
1. 122 Wis. 2d 94, 362 N.W.2d 118 (1985).
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and early 19th century set a standard of care for the legal pro-2
fession of "a fair, reasonable and competent degree of skill."
One of the first reported United States cases concerning
malpractice was Stephens v. White. Plaintiff's attorney in
this case commenced an action on a debt. The attorney negligently handled the matter which resulted in judgment for the
plaintiff being reversed. Plaintiff sued for malpractice and the
attorney defended on the basis that he had not been paid and
therefore no duty arose. The court found that if a man undertakes to perform a professional act, he is chargeable for neglect to the person who employed him, although he has
received no reward. This result is significant as early British
cases held that a barrister could not be sued by a client for
malpractice because the barrister had no reciprocal right to
sue his client for a fee.
One of the earliest United States Supreme Court cases was
Savings Bank v. Ward.4 In this case a negligence action was
instituted against an attorney by a third-party lender who had
relied on the attorney's certification of title in making a loan
secured by land purportedly owned by the prospective buyer.
It was later determined that the borrower did not own the
land and subsequently a malpractice action against the attorney was brought by the third-party lending institution. The
standard of care required under this case was "a reasonable
degree of care and skill in the performance of such duties; and
if injury results to the client for a want of such a degree of
reasonable care and skill, the attorney may be held to respond
in damages to the extent of the injury sustained." 5 The Court
went on to state:
[I]t must not be understood that an attorney is liable for
every mistake that may occur in practice, or that he may be
held responsible to his client for every error of judgment in
the conduct of his client's cause. Instead of that, the rule is
that if he acts with a proper degree of skill, and with reason2. Lanphier v. Phipos, 173 Eng. Rep. 581, 583 (K.B. 1838). See also Montriou v.
Jeflerys, 172 Eng. Rep. 51 (K.B. 1825); Pitt v. Yalden, 98 Eng. Rep. 74 (K.B. 1767);
Russell v. Palmer, 95 Eng. Rep. 837 (K.B. 1767).
3. 2 Va. 709 (2 Wash. 203, 1796).

4. 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
5. Id. at 198.
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able care and to the best of his knowledge, he will not be
responsible.6
In addition, liability in Ward was limited to the client and not
to third parties. This was one of the first statements on the
issue of privity. Significantly, while a negligence approach
was adopted by the court in Ward, the standard of care only
required representation to the best of the attorney's knowledge. This overall attitude and the underlying faith in the
profession which it represented continued as the general judicial view of attorney malpractice actions until the early
1960s.7 The courts began to take a tougher approach toward
the errors of attorneys and the consequences of their errors
after that time.
Some state cases approached the malpractice issue as a
question of breach of contract, 8 while others used a tort analysis.9 Even in the contract approach, however, courts often
found that the attorney contracted to exercise the degree of
skill and care required by the tort standard. The primary differences between the two approaches were that in contract actions the statute of limitations was longer and the measure of
damages was more limited.
In most of the early malpractice actions there was a requirement of privity between the attorney and client. In other
words, third parties who were potentially affected by the alleged malpractice had no specific right to sue the malpracticing attorney. Privity was required in order for the attorney
and client to maintain control over their own contract and to
limit what would otherwise be an attorney's boundless duty to
the public.
The requirement of privity began to erode in the late
1950s.10 The erosion of the privity requirement has followed
two basic theories. The strict privity requirement has some6. Id. (citation omitted).
7. See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
8. Goodman & Mitchell v. Walker, 30 Ala. 482, 495, 68 Am. Dec. 137 (1857); Neel
v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 837 (1971); Kurtenbach v. TeKippe, 260 N.W.2d 53 (Iowa 1977); Grago v. Robertson, 49 A.D.2d 645, 370 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1975).
9. Jones v. White, 90 Ind. 255 (1883).

10. Lucas, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821; Biakanja v. Irving, 49
Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
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times been circumvented on the basis of a third-party beneficiary analysis. 1I Under such an analysis the non-client must
prove that the client directly intended to benefit the non-client
by his or her relationship with counsel in order for the non-2
client to successfully assert malpractice by the attorney.1
This approach3 has been specifically adopted in Illinois and
Pennsylvania.'
Another theory which forms the basis for inroads on the4
privity requirement is the "balancing of factors" theory.'
Under this policy-based theory the court balances the following factors to determine whether the attorney is liable to parties not in privity:
(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to
affect the plaintiff;
(2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff;
(3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury;
(4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury;
(5) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct;
and
(6) the policy of preventing future harm. 5
II.

ELEMENTS OF A WISCONSIN MALPRACTICE CASE

The basic elements of a legal malpractice case in Wisconsin are founded upon fundamental concepts of negligence.
Plaintiff must prove the existence of an attorney-client relationship and the failure of the defendant attorney to exercise
the skill and knowledge possessed by other members of the
profession. Plaintiff must show that the attorney's failure to
exercise such skills or the breach of duty was the proximate
11. See Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1181, 1190 (1972). For a summary of developments
in this area, see Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 906-08 (Iowa 1978).
12. Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, -, 492 A.2d 618, 625-26 (1985).
13. Ogle v. Fuiten, 102 Ill. 2d 356, -, 466 N.E.2d 224, 227 (1984); York v. Stiefel,
99 Ill. 2d 312, _ 458 N.E.2d 488, 492 (1983); Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d
744 (1983).
14. See Lucas, 56 Cal. 2d at -., 364 P.2d at 687, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 823; Biakanja, 49
Cal. 2d at _, 320 P.2d at 19; Bucquet v. Livingston, 57 Cal. App. 3d 914, 922, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 514, 518 (1976); Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d
104, 111, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901, 905 (1976).
15. Flaherty, 303 Md. at -, 492 A.2d at 622 (footnote omitted).
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cause of actual damage to the client. As discussed above, this
duty may be extended to a third party if the defendant attorney can be shown to owe a duty to that person under either a
third-party beneficiary analysis, balancing of factors analysis,
or other approaches.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated the rule regarding a
lawyer's
liability for malpractice in the early case of Malone v.
16
Gerth.

[A]n attorney must be held to undertake to use a reasonable
degree of care and skill, and to possess to a reasonable extent
the knowledge requisite to a proper performance of the duties of his profession, and, if injury results to the client as a
proximate consequence of the lack of such knowledge or
skill, or from the failure to exercise it, the client may recover
damages to the extent of the injury sustained; but we are all
human beings, and attorneys are not responsible for errors
and mistakes that they make. If an attorney is fairly capacitated to discharge the duties ordinarily incumbent upon one
of his profession, and acts with a proper degree of attention,
and with reasonable care, and to the best of his skill, he will
not be responsible. He must, of course, act toward his client
with integrity and honesty. 7
The above quote from Malone seems to exempt lawyers from
the consequences of "errors and mistakes that they make." In
State v. Bonisz,' 8 the court stated this is not what it meant; it
found the client entitled to protection against the attorney's
carelessness or incompetence. 19
The basic elements of a malpractice case thus include negligence, proximate cause, and actual damages. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court has succinctly delineated what must be shown
in a malpractice action:
In an action against an attorney for negligence or violation
of duty, the client has the burden of proving the existence of
the relation of attorney and client, the acts constituting the
alleged negligence, that the negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury, and the fact and extent of the injury alleged. The last element mentioned often involves the burden
of showing that, but for the negligence of the attorney, the
16.
17.
18.
19.

100 Wis. 166,
Id. at 173-74,
231 Wis. 157,
Id. at 168-69,

75 N.W. 972 (1898).
75 N.W. at 974.
285 N.W. 386 (1939).
285 N.W. at 391.
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client would have been successful in the prosecution or defense of an action. 0
The question of the existence of error in a malpractice case
is a mixed question of law and fact.2 This is because the trier
of fact is confronted with the dual problem of what a particular attorney did or failed to do, and what a reasonable or prudent attorney would do in the same circumstance.22 The
standard of care to be applied in a particular case in order to
determine the level of skill required of the defendant attorney
and the fact of deviation from that standard is usually established by expert testimony. 3
Expert testimony is required to establish a prima facie case
of malpractice in most jurisdictions.2 4 When the case turns on
an issue not related to legal expertise, expert testimony may
not be necessary. 5 Expert witnesses are not necessary where
the record discloses obvious and undisputed carelessness or
conduct not necessarily related to legal expertise.2 6 Finally,
expert testimony is not required where counsel failed to follow
the explicit instructions of the client, 27 and such failure caused
the resultant harm.
As in any negligence case, the fact that the defendant attorney has breached a duty to the client must be linked to the
attorney actually causing the plaintiff's damages. Not every
act of carelessness nor every mistake of judgment made by an
attorney will necessarily be a causative factor of the client's
harm. The attorney, for instance, is not required to unfail20. Lewandowski v. Continental Casualty Co., 88 Wis. 2d 271, 277, 276 N.W.2d
284, 287 (1979) (quoting 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 188, at 156 (1963)).
21. Helmbrecht v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d 94, 112, 362 N.W.2d 118, 128

(1985).
22. Id.

23. See Olfe v. Gordon, 93 Wis. 2d 173, 181, 286 N.W.2d 573, 577 (1980); see also
Annot., 14 A.L.R.4th 170 (1982).
24. See Schmidt v. Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, 75 Ill. App.
3d 516, 394 N.E.2d 559 (1979); House v. Maddox, 46 Ill. App. 3d 68, 360 N.E.2d 580
(1977); Brown v. Gitlin, 19 II. App. 3d 1018, 313 N.E.2d 180 (1974); Kohler v. Woollen, Brown & Hawkins, 15 Il. App. 3d 455, 304 N.E.2d 677 (1973); Sanders v. Smith,
83 N.M. 706, 496 P.2d 1102 (1972).
25. See Maddox, 46 Ill. App. 3d 68, 360 N.E.2d 580; Muse v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 698 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Hill v. Okay Constr. Co., 312
Minn. 324, 252 N.W.2d 107 (1977); Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d
1238 (1975).
26. O/fe, 93 Wis. 2d at 181-82, 286 N.W.2d at 577.
27. Id. at 184, 286 N.W.2d at 578.
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ingly predict how a court will interpret a document twenty
years after it is drafted. The wide range of activity between
competence and malpractice was recognized in Denzer v.
Rouse.28
In order to show proximate cause, plaintiff must prove the
underlying merits of the original claim, including the fact that
any judgment so obtained would have been collectible.29
Plaintiff must prove what the outcome would have been but
for the negligence of the attorney. One way to determine the
value of the lost claim of a plaintiff is to retry the underlying
cause of action. Thus, plaintiff must prove "two cases in a
single proceeding" in order to prevail in some Wisconsin malpractice actions.30 In Lewandowski v. Continental Casualty
Co.,31 the plaintiff proved his underlying personal injury claim
before the malpractice trial jury and established before that
jury the amount he would have received but for the negligence
of his attorney. The court in Lewandowski specifically recognized that situations may arise where the value of the original
action could not be determined by a trial within the trial.32 A
malpractice case founded on an attorney's failure to appeal,
for instance, turns on the merits of legal issues which would
have been raised in such an appeal. Similarly, only an issue of
law is presented when the client was the defendant in the underlying action and the attorney failed to raise a specific meritorious defense.33 In the latter two examples, these issues of
law would be determined by the court, rather than a trial
within the trial before the finder of fact.
Other jurisdictions which have considered the issue of determination of damages have reached differing solutions. In
several jurisdictions, under somewhat unusual circumstances,

28. 48 Wis. 2d 528, 534, 180 N.W.2d 521, 524-25 (1970).
29. See Floro v. Lawton, 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1960); Priest v.
Dodsworth, 235 Il. 613, 85 N.E. 940 (1908); Baker v. Beal, 225 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa
1975); Hoppe v. Ranzini, 158 N.J. Super. 158, 385 A.2d 913 (1978); Vooth v.
McEachen, 181 N.Y. 28, 73 N.E. 488 (1905).
30. Lewandowski, 88 Wis. 2d at 277, 276 N.W.2d at 287.
31. 88 Wis. 2d 271, 276 N.W.2d 284 (1979).
32. Id. at 278-81, 276 N.W.2d at 287-89.
33. Id. at 279, 276 N.W.2d at 288. See also Baker, 225 N.W.2d 106; Fuschetti v.
Bierman, 128 N.J. Super. 290, 319 A.2d 781 (1974).
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expert testimony has been admitted as evidence of the underlying settlement or judgment value of the case. 4
III.

RELATED ISSUES

The burden of proof in a negligence action normally lies
with the plaintiff. The exception to this rule occurs in cases
involving the breach of fiduciary duty owed by the defendant
attorney. Some jurisdictions have found that where a fiduciary duty is owed by the attorney to the client, the burden of
proof shifts to the attorney. 35 The Louisiana courts have held
that where the client makes a prima facie showing of negligence, the burden shifts to the defendant attorney to show
that the client could not have succeeded notwithstanding the
impropriety.36
The preponderance of the evidence is the required standard of proof. It is usually not possible to prove absolutely
what would have occurred had the malpractice not taken
place. Plaintiff therefore must only show what would probably have occurred absent the malpractice.37
Both the malpracticing attorney and the partners of the
law firm may be liable to a client.3 8 This duty of loyalty runs
from each attorney employed by the firm to every client of the
firm . 39 The same general rule applies to attorneys who practice as members of a professional corporation. 4° A referring
34. See Duncan v. Lord, 409 F. Supp. 687 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Warwick, Paul & Warwick v. Dotter, 190 So. 2d 596 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 233
(Fla. 1967); Central Cab Co. v. Clarke, 259 Md. 542, 270 A.2d 662 (Ct. App. 1970);
Shields v. Campbell, 277 Or. 71, 559 P.2d 1275 (1977); Helmbrecht, 122 Wis. 2d 94, 362
N.W.2d 118.
35. Hicks v. Clayton, 67 Cal. App. 3d 251, 136 Cal. Rptr. 512 (1977); Jacobsen v.
National Bank of Austin, 65 Il. App. 3d 455, 382 N.E.2d 277 (1978); Abrams, Kisseloff
& Kissen v. 160 Bleecker St. Assocs., 67 A.D.2d 629, 412 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1979).
36. See Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 422 So. 2d 1109 (La. 1982).
37. Lewandowski v. Continental Casualty Co., 88 Wis. 2d 271, 281, 276 N.W.2d
284, 289 (1979). See also Floro v. Lawton, 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98
(1960); Vooth v. McEachen, 181 N.Y. 28, 73 N.E. 488 (1905); Gladden v. Logan, 28
A.D.2d 1116, 284 N.Y.S.2D 920 (1967).
38. Waldeck v. Brande, 61 Wis. 579, 21 N.W. 533 (1884); see also Annot., 76
A.L.R.3d 1020 (1977).
39. See Harman v. La Crosse Tribune, 117 Wis. 2d 448, 344 N.W.2d 536 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 58 (1984).
40. Wis. STAT. § 180.99(8) (1983-84).
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attorney may also be liable in a referral to other counsel, 4 1 if
they agree to split the fee or recovery.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been suggested in
some jurisdictions as a means of allowing a jury to consider a
question of malpractice without expert testimony. 42 In some
jurisdictions there is precedent for bifurcating the process so
that the issue of malpractice is determined separately from the
issue of the value of the underlying case.43 Bifurcation has the
advantage of separating and clarifying the issues in a case
where the underlying cause of action is complex and confusion with the ultimate question of attorney negligence could
result from a trial where both issues are heard simultaneously.
Finally, the statute of limitations in malpractice cases was
originally found to run from the time of the injury.44 The recent adoption of the "discovery rule" in tort actions by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court4 5 undoubtedly will apply to malpractice actions. This will continue to expand the liability of
Wisconsin practitioners.
IV.

STATISTICAL TRENDS

Within the past thirty years, malpractice claims against attorneys have evolved from a matter of passing concern to an
increasingly common and disturbing problem. The shrinking
availability of malpractice insurance coverage and its rising
cost have also become matters of concern to practicing attorneys. The underlying reasons behind these changing statistics
are not factors which can be proven empirically. Within the
past thirty years there has been an overall change in public
attitudes and a greater tendency to hold professionals accountable for their actions. In general, individuals feel that if
they have been harmed, they are entitled to reimbursement
41. See Floro, 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98; Hill v. Curtis, 154 A.D. 662,
139 N.Y.S. 428 (1913).
42. Donato v. Dutton, Kappes & Overman, 154 Ind. App. 17, 288 N.E.2d 795
(1972). Contra Mazer v. Security Ins. Group, 368 F. Supp. 418, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1973),
aff'd, 507 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975); Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457, 475 (1934).
43. Cohen v. Surrey, Karasik & Morse, 427 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1977); McDow
v. Dixon, 138 Ga. App. 338, 226 S.E.2d 145 (1976); Hoppe v. Ranzini, 158 N.J. Super.
158, 385 A.2d 913 (1978); Fuschetti v. Bierman, 128 N.J. Super. 290, 319 A.2d 781
(1974).
44. Denzer v. Rouse, 48 Wis. 2d 528, 533, 180 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1970).
45. Hansen v. A. H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983).
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from some quarter. This expectation has arisen at a time
when courts have often modified traditional legal theories to
expand potential liability of defendants. In addition, the standard of care for lawyers has increased as they become more
and more specialized and as the law itself evolves into distinct
areas of expertise. Lawyers have become less reluctant to take
cases against their colleagues and to testify against other attorneys. Nevertheless, clients have become more aggressive in
asserting their own rights. All of these factors have combined
with the fact that many areas of legal practice have become
increasingly complicated and thus have increased not only the
likelihood of errors, but also the likelihood that the client injured by the error will sue the attorney.
Unfortunately, reliable data on the types of claims filed
and the average amount of recovery is often difficult to obtain.
Insurance industry statistics show a quadrupling of claims between 1973 and 1976 from 1.8 to 7.2 claims per 100 policies.46
The same source indicates a doubling in the amount paid per
claim from 1971 to 1975. The statistics provided by the ABA
Standing Committee on Lawyer's Professional Liability, however, do not show the increase to be this large. The ABA
Standing Committee operates the National Legal Malpractice
Data Center as a joint effort with several legal malpractice insurance carriers. Its data bank is nationwide. Through September 30, 1983, information was collected on 18,420 claims.
The following information is based upon statistical analysis of
these claims.47
ABA

DATA CENTER STATISTICS

In its September, 1983 report, the Data Center found that
35.8% of the claims were made against sole practitioners and
44.3% against firms of between two and five attorneys. 48 Unfortunately, the Data Center does not have demographic in46. Francis J. McCarthy, Insurance Aspects of Legal Malpractice, in American
Bar Association, Section of Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law, Professional
Liability of Trial Lawyers, The Malpractice Question 5064 (Chicago, Amer. Bar Assoc.,
1979).
47. ABA Comm. on Lawyer's Professional Liability National Legal Malpractice
Data Center 3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Data Center Report].
48. Id.
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formation,4 9 so it is not possible to determine statistically if
such figures are significant in terms of the absolute number of
practitioners in each group. Since it is not known what percentage of lawyers nationwide practice in firms of four or
fewer attorneys, the significance of these particular percentages is unclear.50 The following information was obtained
from the National Data Center's 1983 report. In some cases
updated cumulative figures through 1985 are also provided."
Sole practitioners have
-35% of all claims-(1985, 34.9%)
-43.1% of all family law claims 52
-43.6% of all criminal law claims
Firms of between six and thirty attorneys have
-18.6% of all claims
-33.2% of SEC claims
-34.2% of all personal injury defendant claims53
The Data Center codes all of the data it receives and analyzes it according to areas of law in which the attorney was
retained by the client. The data is further coded according to
the activity in which the attorney was engaged at the time the
error was made and the nature of the error which was the
underlying cause of the claim.5 4 The following are the predominant areas in which claims arose according to the ABA
statistics:
49. Id. at 1.
50. Id. at 1-2.
51. In some of the following tables where the data does not appear to total 100%,
some statistical information has been deleted because of insufficient data or rounding off
of numbers.
52. Data Center Report, supra note 47, at 10. The 1985 figures are from a telephone interview with Sharee Swetin, American Bar Association, National Legal Malpractice Data Center (Feb. 1986).
53. Data Center Report, supra note 47, at 21-22.
54. See infra notes 58-61.
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1985

Bankruptcy
12.3%
10.5%
Estates and Trusts
7.1%
7.0%
Family Law
7.8%
7.9%
Personal InjuryPlaintiff
24.0%
25.1%
Real Estate
24.9%
23.3% 55
26.2%
23.9%
All other
Because of the lack of demographic data, it is not known
what percentage of all attorneys' activities are devoted to particular areas of practice.5 6 Therefore, in analyzing these statistics it is impossible to conclude absolutely that a
disproportionate number of claims arise in the personal injury
or real estate areas of practice, although that appears to be the
case.

An analysis of the type of alleged error in all cases combined produced the following data:
1983
1985
Administrative Errors
20%
25.76%
Client Relations
15%
16.27%
Intentional Wrongs
11%
11.59%
Substantive Errors

45%

43.59%57

There are large variances in the above statistics in different
areas of legal practice. The most notable differences of error
by area of law are:
1. Substantive Errors are the source of 56.7% of all claims
involving Real Estate and 32.8% of all claims involving
Personal Injury/Plaintiff actions. 8
55. The 1983 figures are from Data Center Report, supra note 47, at 10. 1985
figures are from a telephone interview with Sheree Swetin, supra note 52.
56. Data Center Report, supra note 47, at 10.

57. Id. at 11 (1983 figures). The 1985 figures are from a telephone interview with
Sheree Swetin, supra note 52.
58. Data Center Report, supra note 47, at 14. The Center defines Substantive Er-

rors as to include a failure to know or ascertain a deadline correctly, an error in mathematical calculation, an error in public record search, a planning error in choice of
procedures, inadequate discovery of facts, inadequate investigation, a failure to understand or anticipate consequences, a failure to know or properly apply the law or a con-

flict of interest. Id. at 12.
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Administrative Errors are the source of 15.5% of all
claims involving Real Estate and 48.9% of all claims in-

volving the Personal Injury/Plaintiff area.19
3.

Client Relations are the source of 10.3% of all claims
involving Personal Injury/Plaintiff claims and 24.4% of
all claims involving Family Law.'
4. Intentional Wrongs are the source of 13.5% of all claims
involving Family Law, 14.6% of all claims in Collec-

tion/Bankruptey, 8.6% of all claims in Real Estate,
8.9% in Estates, Trusts, Probate and 6.0% of all claims

6a
in Personal Injury/Plaintiff.
Finally, the overall 1983 statistics show that 52.2% of all
claims arise from litigation activities.62 The figure for 1985 is
44.8%.63 The breakdown of the activities which comprise
these totals is as follows:

Commencement of Action
Pretrial
Trial
Post-trial
Settlement
Appeal

1983
25.2%
7.2%
7.1%
1.9%
8.0%
2.0%

1985
24.8%
8.0%
6.8%
2.7%
7.9%
2.6%64

DISPOSITION OF CLAIMS

The Data Center also compiled statistics on the disposition
of claims. In both 1983 and 1985, no payment was made to
the claimant in 67.5% of the cases.65 In the remaining cases
59. Data Center Report, supra note 47, at 14. The Center defines Administrative

Errors to include a failure to calendar properly, a failure to react to the calendar, a
failure to fie documents where no search is involved, procrastination in performance,
lack of follow-up, lost file, document or evidence or clerical error. Id. at 12.
60. Data Center Report, supra note 47, at 14. The Center defines Client Relations
errors to include a failure to follow client's instructions, failure to obtain client's consent
or to inform client, or improper withdrawal from representation. Id. at 12.
61. Data Center Report, supra note 47, at 14. The Center defines Intentional
Wrongs to include libel or slander, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, violation of

civil rights or fraud. Id. at 12.
62. Id. at 21.
63. Telephone interview with Sheree Swetin, supra note 52.
64. The 1983 figures are from Data Center Report, supra note 47, at 22. The 1985
figures are from a telephone interview with Sheree Swetin, supra note 52.
65. Data Center Report, supra note 47, at 28. No-payment, abandoned claims accounted for 51.3% of the cases while 16.2% of the suits were dismissed. Id. at 24.
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in which payments were made, they were made in the following manner:
1983
1985
Settlement/No suit
19.8%
19.4%
Settlement after suit commenced 11.5%
12.0%
1.1%66
1.1%
Judgment for Plaintiff
The above claims disposition results can also be correlated
with various areas of practice. In the following table the 1985
statistics are in parenthesis:
Personal Estates,
Real Injury Trusts
All
Estate Plaintiff Probate Family Criminal claims
No Payment 54.7
43.2
50.4
56.9
48.5
51.2*
(52.4) (42.9)
(52.2) (54.1)
(50.4) (50.0)**
Payment/
No Suit
19.1
27.5
23.4
10.8
9.1
19.8
(18.7) (28.1)
(22.5) (11.0)
(8.0) (19.5)
Payment/
Suit
9.8
16.4
10.9
11.1
3.8
11.6
(11.2) (16.6)
(10.6) (10.4)
(3.1) (12.0)
Suit
Dismissed
15.3
11.3
14.1
20.8
36.4
16.2
(16.2) (10.7)
(13.7) (24.1)
(37.1) (17.4)
Payment/
Judgment
1.1
1.6
1.2
.3
2.3
1.1
(1.4)
(1.7)
(1.0)
(.4)
(1.3)
(1.1)
*
**

1983
(1985)67
AMOUNT OF PAYMENT

Of the 32.3% of cases nationwide for 198368 (32.7% for
1985)69 in which payments actually were made to claimants,
the following statistics have been compiled:
66.
figures
67.
figures
68.
69.

The 1983 figures are from Data Center Report, supra note 47, at 24. The 1985
are from a telephone interview with Sheree Swetin, supra note 52.
The 1983 figures are from Data Center Report, supra note 47, at 26. The 1985
are from a telephone interview with Sheree Swetin, supra note 52.
Data Center Report, supra note 47, at 28.
Telephone interview with Sheree Swetin, supra note 52.
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Payment Amount
From $1 to $1,000
From $1,001 to $5,000
From $5,001 to $10,000
From $10,001 to $25,000
From $25,001 to $50,000
From $50,001 to $100,000
Over $100,000

Percentages of
Cases
1983
1985
3.1%
2.8%
8.8%
8.9%
5.6%
6.6%

5.8%

6.5%

3.3%
2.2%

3.0%
1.9% 7 0

4.3%

3.0%

The above statistics do not include defense costs. Of all

the claims, 65.2% incurred defense costs of under $1,000.71
V.

WISCONSIN STATISTICS

Wisconsin statistics show trends very similar to those
found in the ABA data. Small firms of between one to four
lawyers account for nearly two-thirds of all claims made
against the Bar endorsed insurance program.72
70. The 1983 figures are from Data Center Report, supra note 47, at 28. The 1985
figures are from a telephone interview with Sheree Swetin, supra note 52.
71. Data Center Report, supra note 47, at 29.
72. Report from Lawyers Professional Liability Program for State Bar of Visconsin, Section V (June 30, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Lawyers Professional Liability
Report].
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CHART 1
STATE BAR OF WISCONSIN
LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY PROGRAM
% LOSSES BY FIRM SIZE (BY NUMBER OF CLAIMS)

VALUED AS OF JUNE 30, 1985
Firm Size
1
2-3
4
5-6
7-10
11-19
20 Plus

1982/83 PY
24.0%
35.1%
9.3%
16.9%
5.3%
9.4%*
100.0%

1983/84 PY
29.6%
28.5%
9.0%
13.0%
10.1%
6.5%
3.3%
100.0%

1984/85 PY
28.8%
27.0%
11.8%
11.2%
9.5%
5.5%
6.2%
100.0% 73

* Records kept for policy year 1982/83 combined
firm sizes 11 and above.
CHART 2
STATE BAR OF WISCONSIN
LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY PROGRAM
% LOSSES BY FIRM SIZE (BY DOLLARS PAID OUT)
VALUED AS OF JUNE 30, 1985
Firm Size
1
2-3
4
5-6
7-10
11-19
20 plus

1982/83 PY
28.0%
28.8%
16.7%
18.1%
.9%
7.5%*
100.0%

1983/84 PY
27.3%
35.6%
11.1%
7.0%
6.1%
12.4%
.5%
100.0%

1984/85 PY
24.2%
25.9%
18.1%

8.4%
12.6%
3.2%
7.6%
100.0%

74

* Records kept for policy year 1982/83 combined
firm sizes 11 and above.
The reason more claims are made against smaller firms is
not empirically provable. It is apparent, however, that certain
types of back-up and in-house consultation and administrative
73. Id.
74. Id.
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support staff are less available to members of small firms than
lawyers from larger firms.
The total number of claims and incidents reported in the
Wisconsin-bar endorsed plan have also increased sharply
within the past three years. The increase has been from a total
of 225 combined incidents and claims in the 1982-83 policy
year to a total of 400 for the 1984-1985 policy year, a 50%
increase in two years.75
CHART 3
STATE BAR OF WISCONSIN
LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY PROGRAM
CLAIM SUMMARY BY POLICY YEAR
1982/83 PY 1983/84 PY 1984/85 PY
Total Claims and Incidents
Reported (#)

225

276

400

Incidents (#)
64
79
219
Lawsuits (*)
57
104
106
Demands (#)
82
85
67
Claims Denied (#)
9
2
1
Claims with Other
Defense Provided (#)
13
6
7
Total Payments ($)
$1,171,392 $1,736,193
$217,757
Indemnity Payments ($)
772,368
1,259,263
95,937
121,82076
476,930
399,024
Expense Payments ($)
The above dollar figures seem to indicate that amounts
paid out are declining in the 1984-85 fiscal year. This is not
the case. Settlements and litigation have not been completed
in the most recent claims, so the figures for 1984-85 do not
accurately represent the real increase in this area. The total
payouts which have resulted from claims have increased during the period from 1982 to 1984, and it is anticipated that
they will continue to increase. It is not possible to state absolutely what the actual payouts for a given year represent. The
75. Id. at Section VI.
76. Id. "Incidents" include any notification from insureds to the insurer of
incidents which have not yet ripened into an actual claim; "demands" include demands
not yet matured into litigation; and "other defenses provided" include situations where
coverage is available through some other source, for example where a practitioner
practices part time in the public and private sector. Id.
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Wisconsin plan is a "claims made" rather than an "occurrence" policy. All prior acts of malpractice within a given
period are covered, and therefore, as the policy gets older,
more and more claims actually mature. It also takes between
three and four years to completely investigate and resolve
some claims so that the amounts paid out in any given year
may not totally reflect the type and amount of claims made in
that particular year. It is clear, however, from the above statistics that the number of claims have almost doubled between
1982 and 1985, and it is anticipated that the sums paid out
will increase accordingly.77
There are some specific areas of law practice which generate the most malpractice claims based on 1984-85 statistics.
These are real estate; personal injury/plaintiff; commercial
law, bankruptcy and creditors' rights; and family law.78 Because these areas of practice generate the most claims, certain
insurance carriers have begun to add a surcharge on policies
where the attorney practices primarily in these areas.
77. Telephone interview with Joseph Branch, Chairperson for the Insurance for
Members Committee, State Bar of Wisconsin (Nov. 1985).
78. Lawyers Professional Liability Report, supra note 72, at Section VII.
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CHART 4
STATE BAR OF WISCONSIN
LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY PROGRAM
1984/1985 POLICY YEAR
ALL CLAIMS
AREA OF PRACTICE TOTAL
Personal Injury/Property Damage - Plaintiff
Real Estate
Commercial Law, Bankruptcy, Creditors' Rights
Corporate and Business
Organization
Family Law
Estate, Trust and Probate
Personal Injury/Property Damage - Defendant
Criminal
Taxation
Civil Rights and Discrimination
All Others

TOTAL
64
34
33
24
23
19
14
12
10
8
2479

Finally, the types activities which generate claims can also
be divided into categories. The largest area of offense is that
of "failure to know or ascertain deadlines," the second, "planning error inchoice of procedure." 80
79. Id.
80. Id.
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CHART 5
STATE BAR OF WISCONSIN
LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY PROGRAM
1984/1985 POLICY YEAR
ALL CLAIMS
TYPE OF ERROR
TOTAL
Failure to Know Deadline or to Ascertain
Deadline Correctly
30
Procrastination in Performance of Services
24
Planning Error in Choice of Procedures
24
Inadequate Discovery of Facts or Inadequate
Investigation
22
Failure to Know or Properly Apply the Law
19
Failure to Follow Client's Instructions
17
Failure to File Documents Where No Deadline
is Involved
14
Failure to Inform Client Adequately or to
Obtain the Client's Consent
14
Failure to Understand or Anticipate Tax
Consequences
11
Conflict of Interest
11
Failure to Calendar Properly
10
Failure to React to Calendar
11
5681
An Others (5 or less claims each)
These statistics again are a breakdown of claims made during a given year and do not necessarily total to the number of
claims made during that same year. Specific categories such
as "other defense provided" may be left out of these statistics.
Regardless of this, the statistics do show a general trend of the
types of errors which give rise to malpractice claims. By comparison, a similar statistical analysis for 1982-83 and 1983-84
shows different absolute numbers of claims but relatively the
same percentages in the area of practice statistics with some
differences in the type of errors committed. The trends in all
of these years remain the same.
The major conclusion which can be drawn from this data
is that legal malpractice claims are an ever-increasing problem. Prompt response to clients' queries and careful planning
81. Id.
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and communication with clients are the most often suggested
solutions to this problem.
VI.

MALPRACTICE IN THE COURTROOM

The ABA study defines "litigation errors" broadly to include failure to calendar due dates, procrastination and lack of
follow-up, planning errors in procedure, failure to know or
properly apply the law and so forth. Concern in this section
of the article will be focused on two areas: (1) trial tactics, i.e.,
the trial itself, and (2) settlement of the case before judgment.
In general, the specific handling of evidence and witnesses
at trial and other questions of tactical judgment of trial attorneys have not been "second-guessed" by the Wisconsin
courts.8 2 Attorneys have not been found liable in other states
judgment where the error is not
for harm caused by errors8 in
3
negligence.
to
attributable
Trial counsel's tactics within the trial itself, including
choice of witnesses, areas of cross-examination, and decisions
to use or not to use specific items of evidence,84 have usually
been determined to be within the sole discretion of trial counsel. Increasingly, however, the losers in litigation have begun
to question the specific tactics of their legal counsel and to call
these decisions into question within the forum of a malpractice action.
This is specifically true where the client disagrees with the
chosen tactic or method of presenting the case. In general, the
85
lawyer's good faith decisions in this area have been upheld,
82. Denzer v. Rouse, 48 Wis. 2d 528, 534, 180 N.W.2d 521, 524-25 (1970).
83. Stricklan v. Koella, 546 S.W.2d 810 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977). For other cases
which follow the same line of reasoning, see Mazer v. Security Ins. Group, 368 F. Supp.
418 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 507 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975); Dolan Title & Guar. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 395 So. 2d 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Pacelli v. Kloppenberg, 65 IlM.App. 3d 150, 382 N.E.2d 570 (1978); Prawer v. Essling, 282 N.W.2d
493 (Minn. 1979).
84. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1976);
Willage v. Law Offices of Wallace & Breslow, 415 So. 2d 767 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982);
Oda v. Highway Ins. Co., 44 IlI. App. 2d 235, 194 N.E.2d 489 (1963); Prawer, 282
N.W.2d 493; Sanders v. Smith, 83 N.M. 706, 496 P.2d 1102 (1972); Utterback-Gleason
Co. v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 193 A.D. 646, 184 N.Y.S. 862 (1920), aff'd, 233
N.Y. 549, 135 N.E. 913 (1922).
85. Cardaerella v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 813, 816 (W.D. Mo. 1966), aff'd,
375 F.2d 222, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882 (1967); Stricklan, 546 S.W.2d at 814.
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but where strategic decisions will affect the material outcome
of the case, it has been held that the client must be consulted
on strategy.16 In addition, trial counsel have been found to
87
have a duty to object to incompetent or improper evidence.
This should not be considered a black letter rule. There are
many trial situations in which counsel skillfully allows the admission of improper evidence or purposefully does not object
to certain evidence. This may be good practice depending
upon the facts.
In many of the cases dealing with specific trial decisions
concerning the handling of witnesses, trial counsel's decisions
have been upheld. These include failure to prepare a witness
for cross-examination, 88 failure to impeach a witness, 89 or improperly excusing a witness. 90 Neither does an attorney have
a duty to take a legal position simply because his client desires
it 91 nor to use a defense which has no prospect for success
even though his client desires it. While in general courtroom
tactics are largely immune from attack as constituting malpractice, the existence of the foregoing cases makes it clear
that inroads have been made even in this area. The Wisconsin
appellate court has implied that an attorney may be sued for
malpractice for errors made in the conduct of litigation. 92 The
court has also stated that the trial judge has a duty to protect
the rights of litigants in his or her court and has a duty to
intervene before the professional misconduct of an attorney
affects the substantive rights of the parties. 93 Thus, strategic
decisions within the courtroom may be called into question in
a malpractice action.
86. Lowe v. Continental Ins. Co., 437 So. 2d 925 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 442
So. 2d 460 (1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 942 (1984).
87. State v. Staley, 292 N.C. 160, 232 S.E.2d 680 (1977); McMahan v. City of Abilene, 8 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
88. See Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
89. Sanders, 83 N.M. 706, 496 P.2d 1102.
90. Johnson v. American Life Ins. Co., 237 Ala. 70, 185 So. 409 (1938).
91. Gallegos v. Turner, 256 F. Supp. 670 (D. Utah 1966), aff'd, 386 F.2d 440 (10th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1045 (1968); Sprague v. Moore, 136 Mich. 426, 99
N.W. 377 (1904).
92. Village of Big Bend v. Anderson, 103 Wis. 2d 403, 406, 308 N.W.2d 887, 889
(Ct. App. 1981).
93. Id. at 407-08, 308 N.W.2d at 890.
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If the underlying reason for a tactical choice is insufficient,
negligence may be found. 94 In addition, potential liability has
been found for failure to procure and introduce evidence on
an available legal theory, 95 failure to adequately resist a motion for summary judgment, 96 failure to present an available
defense, 97 and
failure to adequately prepare a defendant for a
98
deposition.

VII.

THE CONTRASTING ENGLISH VIEW

To avoid the problems of dissecting the underlying cause
of action and determining which tactical and strategic decisions may have constituted negligence, the English courts
have adopted a broader immunity rule for tactical trial decisions of barristers. 99 Prior to Rondel v. Worsley,' °° the English
courts permitted suits against solicitors for negligence but not
against barristers. The difference in treatment was based on
the fact that barristers could not sue their clients for a fee, so
they could not in turn be sued by their clients for negligence.' 0 1 In Rondel, Judge Lawton, the decision's author, did
not distinguish between barristers and solicitors and did not
consider the question of ability to sue for a fee as decisive. 102
Rather, he analyzed the role of the advocate in general and
the dual duty of the advocate to the court and client. 103 Judge
Lawton dealt with the difficulty of second-guessing a lawyer's
tactical decisions in a malpractice trial which may occur years
after the original trial on the underlying cause of action. Because of the essential part which a legal advocate plays within
the institutional framework which administers justice, Judge
Lawton found immunity for barristers for alleged malpractice
based on decisions which are made within the context of a
trial."' 4 Thus, within the English system, specific tactical deci94. Lewis v. Collins, 260 So. 2d 357 (La. Ct. App. 1972).
95. Partin v. Olney, 121 Ariz. 448, 591 P.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1978).
96. Id.
97. Public Taxi Serv. Inc. v. Barrett, 44 Ill. App. 3d 452, 357 N.E.2d 1232 (1976).
98. Bevevino v. Saydjari, 76 F.R.D. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
99. Rondel v. Worsley, [1967] 1 Q.B. 443.
100. Id. at 455.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 470.
103. Id. at 469.
104. Id. at 470.
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sions made within the context of a trial cannot form the basis
for a malpractice action.
In reaching this decision, Judge Lawton specifically emphasized that an advocate owes a duty to the court as well as
to the clients. 0 5 The advocate cannot be a party to any deception of the court, and he or she must bring any irregularities in
the courtroom proceedings to the court's attention.10 6 The
performance of these duties to the system may in fact prejudice an individual client. Because this dual duty to an individual client and the overall system could make an individual
advocate an easy target for a disgruntled client, Judge Lawton
stated that the immunity rule must continue to protect the
advocate, and as a result, the system of administration of jus0 7
tice itself.'
Judge Lawton concluded that allowing inroads against the
immunity of advocates in a trial room setting would result in
lawyers thinking only about self-protection from claims of
negligence and making tactical decisions not based on solid
legal reasons but upon such self-protection. 08 To avoid this
result, Judge Lawton concluded that the English immunity
rule must stand. 10 9 Rondel has been extended by Saif Ali v.
Sidney Mitchell and Co. 110 to allow immunity for trial advocates to include pretrial work which is tied to strategic decisions in the prosecution of the case.
The contrast between Rondel, which takes a broad view of
the function of the judicial system as a whole and the advocate's role within that system, and the American view is startling. Overall, American case law in the area of legal
malpractice looks specifically at the individual and whether
that individual has suffered a compensable harm. No policy
considerations are made about the effects of compensating an
individual and what effect that may have on the system of administration of justice. Basically, the English courts have decided that the overall functioning of the system is paramount
and that the advocate's dual duty to court and client must be
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 469.

Id.
Id at 470-71.
Id. at 470.
Id.
1980 A.C. 198.
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preserved. American courts have followed the general rule
that if an individual was harmed due to the negligence of an
attorney, there should be compensation regardless of the effects that an individual ruling may have on the overall judicial
system. Thus, while the English courts continue to function
with a rule of advocate immunity for courtroom decisions,
American courts have increasingly begun to question the lawyer's courtroom decisions and to expand areas of liability.
VIII.

HELMBRECHT V. ST. PAUL INSURANCE CO.

Helmbrecht v. St. PaulInsurance Co. Ilis the most recent
statement by the Wisconsin Supreme Court on the issues of
malpractice, including trial related issues. The case arose out
of the representation of Jeanette Helmbrecht in a 1977 divorce
action. Mrs. Helmbrecht's attorney did not conduct adequate
discovery in the case to determine the nature and extent of the
marital estate.1 12 He did not prepare adequately for trial, and
on the day of trial recommended an inadequate settlement to
estate and for a
his client for less than one-half of the marital
113
maintenance award which was inadequate.
The case is important for its consideration of four major
areas: (1) whether the standard used in determining damages
in a legal malpractice action is subjective (what a particular
judge would have awarded) or objective (what a reasonable
judge would have awarded); (2) whether issues of causation
and damages should be decided by the court or a jury (i.e., are
they questions of law or fact); (3) the duty of discovery which
is required in divorce and other civil actions prior to settlement; and (4) the lack of any duty on the part of trial counsel
to settle rather than try cases.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Helmbrecht upheld the
procedure of establishing the value of the plaintiff's malpractice claim by retrying the underlying cause of action before the4
jury in the malpractice action as a "case within the case."' "
The difficulty of determining an objective method of calculating the damages in a case which is originally tried to the court,
111.

122 Wis. 2d 94, 362 N.W.2d 118 (1985).

112. Id. at 115, 362 N.W.2d at 129.
113. Id. at 115-16, 362 N.W.2d at 130.
114. Id. at 118, 362 N.W.2d at 131.
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and not a jury, is demonstrated by the result reached in Helmbrecht. In Helmbrecht the underlying cause of action was a
divorce case in which the parties through their counsel
reached a settlement in chambers on the day of trial, with the
assistance of the trial judge during a settlement conference.
This stipulated settlement was then presented to the court, approved by both parties in open court, and adopted by the trial
judge as part of the findings of fact, conclusions of law and
judgment. In a subsequent malpractice action, the divorce
trial judge was allowed to testify as to whether or not he
would have reached a different decision had the same information been presented to him at the trial.115 The supreme court
in Helmbrecht stated that this method allowed a subjective
rather than objective determination of the value of the case. 116
Rather than a determination of what a specifid judge would
have done, the finder of fact must determine what a reasonable judge would have done under the circumstances."1 7 This
is a decision which must be made by the finder of fact and, of
course in a jury situation, it is the jury which makes that decision. Thus, in this specific type of situation, a jury is secondguessing what a reasonable judge would have or should have
decided in the original case which was tried to the court.
The use of this objective standard places an unusual burden on all practicing divorce lawyers and every lawyer in Wisconsin trying a case to the court and not a jury. When faced
with an offer of settlement, can the lawyer consider what this
particular judge is likely to do based on prior experience? Or,
can the lawyer only consider what an objective and perfect
model judge would be likely to do? The Helmbrecht case provides no guidance. The adoption of this objective standard is
consistent, however, with the general procedural rule that in a
malpractice action, as in any civil action, questions of fact are
for the jury and questions of law are for the court.1 1 8
The second major issue decided by the court in Helmbrecht is that the jury decides factual issues of causation and
115. Id. at 101, 362 N.W.2d at 123.
116. Id. at 107-08, 362 N.W.2d at 124-26.
117. Id. at 105, 362 N.W.2d at 125.
118. Roehl v. Ralph, 84 S.W.2d 405 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935); Utterback-Gleason v.
Standard Accident Ins. Co., 193 A.D. 646, 184 N.Y.S. 862 (1920), aff'd, 233 N.Y. 549,
135 N.E. 913 (1922).
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damage. 119 The basic rule in a malpractice case is that the
judge decides questions of law, and the jury decides questions
of fact, regardless of whether specific issues would have been
decided by the court or jury in the original proceeding. 120 The
breakdown of what constitutes questions of law and fact is
sometimes unclear and thus in practice the division of responsibility between judge and jury is not always cleanly divided.
Helmbrecht is also significant because of the impact of the
decision on a lawyer's willingness to settle cases. Negligence
was found on the part of the attorney for failure to pursue
adequate discovery in the Helmbrecht case. The only discovery done was a brief deposition of the opposing party. 12 1 The
underlying validity of information provided by the opposing
party was not challenged. Specifically, counsel failed to verify
the opposing party's income via bank statements, cancelled
checks, and financial statements filed with lending institutions. 122 Other similar methods of verification were not pursued by counsel in this case. The court in Helmbrecht pointed
out that the existence of Mr. Helmbrecht's safety deposit box
was disclosed by his tax return, 123 and the court found negligence in counsel's failure to determine the contents of such
safety deposit box. In addition, negligence was found in his
failure to obtain an independent appraisal of the value of the
parties' home, of the defendant doctor's dental practice, and
of three trusts. 124
Finally, in terms of reaching a settlement, the supreme
court stated in Helmbrecht that counsel has no duty to negotiate a settlement.125 This statement conflicts with prior judicial
statements, a Wisconsin statute on settlements and various
commentaries on the judicial system, all of which favor settlements over trials. 126 The court stated in Helmbrecht that if
counsel did negotiate a settlement, he has the duty to "negoti119. HeImbrecht, 122 Wis. 2d at 124, 362 N.W.2d at 134.
120. Chocktoot v. Smith, 280 Or. 567, _, 571 P.2d 1255, 1259 (1977).
121. Helmbrecht, 122 Wis. 2d at 115, 362 N.W.2d at 129-30.
122. Id.

123. Id. at 115, 362 N.W.2d at 130.
124. Id. at 119, 362 N.W.2d at 131.
125. Id. at 117, 362 N.W.2d at 131.
126. Johnson v. Pearson Agri-Systems, Inc., 119 Wis. 2d 766, 250 N.W.2d 127
(1984); Wis. STAT. § 807.01 (1983-84).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:515

'
ate with reasonable diligence."127
Such diligence is not possible when inadequate discovery prevents the facts from being
known. The conclusion which must be drawn from the
supreme court's statements in Helmbrecht is that thorough
discovery is essential in every divorce case. While this is an
obvious conclusion, the cost of such in-depth discovery, including verifying income, assets and their fair market value,
and contents of all safety deposit boxes will ultimately be
passed on to the client. The conundrum which this creates is
how to do sufficient discovery to do a thorough job and avoid
a malpractice claim while simultaneously keeping costs reasonable for clients.
The supreme court's statements in Helmbrecht raise several practical issues. Faced with the possible result from a
particular judge which does not comport with what would be
the result by a "reasonable" judge, does an attorney become
exposed to malpractice by advising a client to accept the lesser
amount?1 28 It must be borne in mind that frequently it is the
client's word against the lawyer as to who said what in which
setting. Last minute settlements in the courthouse are seldom
well-documented. What about the expense and uncertainty of
an appeal? What if the client wants a "bird in the hand"
rather than "two birds in the bush?" Does the lawyer tell the
client that the trial judge is not well-known for following appellate decisions and therefore, not a reasonable judge? Certainly a "reasonable lawyer" will be reluctant to put on the
record a recommendation that the client accept a lesser settlement because the judge is not a "reasonable judge." What
happens when the trial judge, acting as a settlement negotiator, presses the client for the reason the client is refusing the
settlement recommended by the judge?
Formal discovery has been frequently criticized as overly
time-consuming, as adding large costs to already expensive litigation and as adding to court congestion by virtue of motions

127. Helmbrecht, 122 Wis. 2d at 117, 362 N.W.2d at 131.
128. Southerland v. County of Oakland, 77 F.R.D. 727 (E.D. Mich. 1978), aff'd,
628 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1980). Negligent handling of settlement negotiations in other
jurisdictions has resulted in liability for the difference between the amount received and
the amount which would have been obtained through proper settlement negotiations.
Lieberman v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 171 N.J. Super. 39, 407 A.2d 1256 (1979),
modified, 84 N.J. 325, 419 A.2d 416 (1980).

1986]

CIVIL LEGAL MALPRACTICE

brought pertaining to the discovery process. If the lawyer is,
however, susceptible to charges of malpractice for failure to
conduct adequate formal discovery, malpractice premiums
will continue to rise, adding to the cost of legal services.
Either way-expensive discovery or expensive insurance-it is
the client who ultimately bears the cost. Refusal to recommend a settlement which might arguably be somewhat less
than an award at trial by "a reasonable judge" and instead
recommending that the client incur the cost of trial and appeal is a cost, both emotionally and financially, which will be
borne by the client. All of these factors could easily cause a
reasonable attorney to be more concerned about protection
from malpractice than about the client's welfare-a result
which no one wants.
IX.

CONCLUSION

It is clear from both the ABA statistics and State Bar statistics that the number of malpractice claims and the amounts
paid out to resolve such claims have continued to increase
yearly. It is not possible to predict if these trends will continue based on currently available statistics, but there is no
reason to assume that the present rate of increase will change.
The threat of malpractice claims tends to make the practice of
law more conservative. The risk of adopting a fresh approach
to legal problems or novel defenses to an action must ultimately be balanced by practicing attorneys against the risk of
a malpractice action should such an untried tactical approach
or novel defense prove unsuccessful. The balance of the advocate's "dual duty" to the court and client thus shifts inevitably
toward the client. The growth of the existing body of law and
the ability of our legal system to adjust to change suffers as a
consequence.
A lawyer cannot function properly as a fearless, impartial
advocate and advisor to the client if it is always necessary to
keep one eye on the client as a potential adversary. It appears
to the authors of this article that allowing lay juries to secondguess economic and strategic trial preparation and trial decisions of a lawyer and award large damages if the jury concludes that the lawyer made the wrong decision, will cause
any reasonably prudent lawyer to resolve almost all doubts in
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favor of more discovery, more trials, more appeals and less
settlements.
There are, of course, many claims for malpractice which
are certainly valid. Failure to file an action, missing a deadline, fraud, failure to know the law, conflict of interests and
the like are all clear examples of malpractice. However, the
concept of a system-wide approach and a balancing of these
values within any fair and functional judicial system must include protection of both the client and the lawyer. High standards of legal practice must be upheld. Obviously, the British
courts' view as stated in Rondel cannot be grafted wholesale
on the United States' system of judicial administration. The
direction in which the balance tips in the future will have a
profound effect upon the continued use of the judicial
system
29
as a forum for the resolution of civil disputes.

129. See supra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.

